Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Reconsidering Recusals: The Need for Requirements for When Not to Recuse|
|Authors:||Lowe, Mason E.|
|Publisher:||Loyola University New Orleans College of Law|
|Citation:||59 Loy. L. Rev. 947|
|Abstract:||In the American judiciary system, it is imperative that judges act free of bias. Although this seems to be an easy-enough-tounderstand theory, its practical application is not always so simple. As a result, there have been wide-ranging, unpredictable, and sometimes undesirable results. Others have noted the need for clearer recusal rules and guidelines. There have been various suggestions for how to improve or reform recusal rules, all of which note that there is a lack of standardized and predictable rules for when judges are required to recuse themselves. These previous suggestions have correctly identified the root of the problem and provided practical solutions to the problem of judges improperly refusing to recuse themselves, but they have also ignored a significant problem with the current landscape of recusal law: an equal need of standardized guidance for when not to recuse, an area not adequately considered to this point. This is not just a hypothetical problem. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Comer v. Murphy Oil shows, a judge's decision to recuse can be just as detrimental, if not more so, than a judge's decision not to recuse.|
|Appears in Collections:||Law Review|
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.